Keegan wrote the following claim about the game "Rock-Paper-Scissors." CLAIM: Players of the seemingly random game "Rock-Paper-Scissors" can continually win rounds of the game by being aware of patterns of choices and paying close attention to opponents' choices. Which of the following sentences should Keegan use as a reason to explain why her claim is true? A. The patterns only come out when the game is played in several rounds, not just one time. B. It may seem that the outcome of the game is random and therefore impossible to predict. C. The winning-hand gesture of the previous round strongly influences players' choice of hand gesture in the next round. D. According to a study, players who lose a round of the game will likely switch, in the next round, to the hand gesture that comes next in the game's name.

Question

Athena Middleton

English

8 May, 18:46

Keegan wrote the following claim about the game "Rock-Paper-Scissors." CLAIM: Players of the seemingly random game "Rock-Paper-Scissors" can continually win rounds of the game by being aware of patterns of choices and paying close attention to opponents' choices. Which of the following sentences should Keegan use as a reason to explain why her claim is true? A. The patterns only come out when the game is played in several rounds, not just one time. B. It may seem that the outcome of the game is random and therefore impossible to predict. C. The winning-hand gesture of the previous round strongly influences players' choice of hand gesture in the next round. D. According to a study, players who lose a round of the game will likely switch, in the next round, to the hand gesture that comes next in the game's name.

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Answers (2)

Know the Answer?

Elisa Branch · Answer 1

D.

Explanation:

this explanation is backed by scientific studies and facts

Lilah Dean · Answer 2

Answer: D.

Explanation:

Rock paper scissors In game theory, Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally.