One of the primary issues for combating transnational drug crime is that the United States has little influence in some key drug-producing areas, such as Taliban-held Afghanistan and Myanmar. A. True B. False

True.

Explanation:

Since the globalization creates an interconnected world, one country has power to affect others as well, and United states tries to control the region to fulfill their interests and do good for American Citizens. But it becomes impossible for them to control when they fail in getting the influence in the area.

For example: Since, 20 years US is trying to get hold on Talibans but have failed miserably, which made manufacturing of the drugs easy and transferring them into the US.

True

Explanation:

Afghanistan and Myanmar heroin is not fueling the deadly U. S. opiate epidemic to any significant degree. And there is very little the United States or other countries can do about the opiate production in Afghanistan. Given the precarious security situation there and the intensification of violent conflict, most policy tools are either ineffective or highly counterproductive. Solutions to the global problem of drug addiction lie within consumer countries themselves.

Most of the expansion of took place in Helmand province, long the hub of Afghan opium production as well as Taliban insurgency. With 144,000 ha cultivated with poppy, that province alone surpasses production levels in all of Myanmar, the world's second largest producer of opiates. But cultivation expanded throughout the country, including in the north, such as in Balkh and Jawzjan.

The current U. S. opioid epidemic is a distressingly deadly one. In 2016, it killed some 64,000 Americans, more than double the number in 2005. Curbing the epidemic is one of the most pressing public health priorities. But neither the addiction nor its death toll are primarily due to Afghan heroin. In fact, Afghan heroin constitutes only a small portion of U. S. opioid consumption

Though stunning in scale, the fact that opium poppy cultivation expanded in Afghanistan is not surprising. The country's economy has been in a deep slump since 2013 when the United States and NATO radically drew down their troop presence, around which much of Afghan economy was built after 2002. Additional factors that hampered Afghanistan's legal economy were the accompanying security failures, the intensification of the Taliban insurgency, the growth in other forms of insecurity (from crime to the Islamic State in Khorasan), and persisting problems with corruption and rule of law.

Afghanistan's illicit drug economy has been deeply entrenched since the 1980s. Temporary decreases in poppy cultivation and heroin production have not been sustained or sustainable. Structural drivers of the illicit drug economy-insecurity, political struggles, and a lack of economic alternatives-remain unaddressed and likely long-term. Although the illicit drug economy exacerbates insecurity, strengthens corruption, produces macroeconomic distortions, and contributes to drug use, it also provides a vital lifeline for many Afghans and enhances their human security. There is simply nothing in Afghanistan that produces more jobs than the opium poppy economy, or could do so in the foreseeable future.